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LIST OF PARTIES
Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. ("Schneider Electric") was a defendant for part
of the proceedings before the trial court. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of all
claims against Schneider Electric (R. 1288-93), and the trial court dismissed those claims
accordingly. (R. 1294-1300.) The dismissal of the claims against Schneider Electric is
not at issue in this appeal.
All other parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are listed in the case
caption.
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2,3,17

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Notice of Appeal filed by Appellants Ginger Gardner, Sabrina Lynn Gardner,
Heather Ann Gardner, and Joshua Lee Gardner (collectively the "Gardners," "Plaintiffs,"
or "Appellants") was timely, and this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2010).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant appellee Schneider Canada Inc.'s

("Schneider Canada") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Gardners correctly note that because the trial
court made its determination concerning personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada
based upon affidavits submitted by the parties, this Court reviews the trial court's
decision for correctness. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^f 2,
8 P.3d 256. However, because the Gardners did not controvert any of the jurisdictional
facts set forth in the affidavits Schneider Canada submitted below, this Court takes those
facts as true for purposes of this appeal, and disregards any contradictory facts that may
be contained in the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint.

Arguello v. Industrial

Woodworking Mack Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).
2.

Should this Court affirm the dismissal of the Gardners' claims against

Schneider Canada on the alternative ground that those claims are moot because the jury's
findings below in their special verdict exonerating SPX Corporation ("SPX") and HOJ

4843-9530-7527.2
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Engineering & Sales Co. Inc. ("HOJ"), together with the trial court's judgment on that
verdict, collaterally estop the Gardners from proving their claims against Schneider
Canada?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The alternative ground for affirmance—mootness—
was never before the trial court for consideration and has become apparent only after the
Gardners framed the issues on appeal. Thus, this Court will necessarily be the first to
undertake a mootness analysis. Nevertheless, ample authority exists for the proposition
that an appellate court will not remand claims where further consideration by the trial
court is futile because the claims are moot. See, e.g., Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc.,
2003 UT 51, f t 130-137, 82 P.3d 1076 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim on alternative
ground that jury verdict in trial below had destroyed an essential factual predicate for
fraud claim, thus rendering claim moot and precluding reversal or remand); see also
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 16, 48 P.3d 968 ("[W]e
will not adjudicate issues when the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed
moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f 25, 16 P.3d 1233).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISONS ON APPEAL
The appeal of the district court's decision to dismiss the Fourth Amended
Complaint against Schneider Canada for lack of personal jurisdiction turns on common
law principles, the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-201 et seq.), and
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

4843-9530-7527.2
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Copies of the Long-Arm Statute and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
are attached hereto as Addendum A and Addendum B, respectively.
The alternative ground upon which this Court can affirm the dismissal of the
claims against Schneider Canada turns exclusively on common law collateral estoppel
and mootness principles and does not rest on any particular constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Schneider Canada objects to the Gardners' Statement of the Case (Br. of
Appellants at 2-9), because it contains characterizations of the evidence and the
proceedings below that unfairly distort and entirely omit important portions of the trial
record.

Schneider Canada offers the following Statement of the Case, which more

accurately describes the facts of the case, the record materials considered by the trial
court, and the proceedings below.
A,

Proceedings Bekw«

On May 26, 2006, the Gardners filed their Fourth Amended Complaint asserting
claims for relief against Schneider Canada for negligence (claim 1), strict liability
(claim 3), failure to warn (claim 4), breach of express and implied warranties (claim 6),
and punitive damages (claim 7), as well as additional claims against the other defendants.
(R. 889-900.) In this action, the Gardners allege that their decedent, Aaron Gardner, was
fatally injured by a dock leveler at dock door number 51 of the Sysco West Jordan
facility. (R. 891.) The Gardners allege the dock leveler was a Serco Dock Leveler that
defendant SPX designed, manufactured, and sold, and defendant HOJ installed. (Id.)

4843-9530-7527.2
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The Gardners filed their Fourth Amended Complaint naming Schneider Canada as
a defendant after SPX identified Schneider Canada as a party it alleged was at fault for
the accident. (R. 892.) According to SPX, Schneider Canada was at fault because it
allegedly sold to SPX a defective control panel, which SPX installed in the final product
that was sold, distributed, and installed at dock door number 51 of the Sysco West Jordan
facility. (R. 892.)
On July 31, 2006, Schneider Canada entered a special appearance and moved to
dismiss the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
(R. 956-986.) Schneider Canada brought its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that it is a
Canadian corporation with no place of business and no other significant presence in the
state of Utah. (R. 957-58.) Schneider Canada argued it was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in the trial court because, "[w]hile Schneider Canada designed and
manufactured a component part of the subject dock door leveler—specifically, the control
box placed in the subject dock door leveler—the marketing, design, manufacture,
construction, distribution and sale of the component control box occurred entirely in
Canada" {Id.; emphasis in original.) Schneider Canada supported its Motion to Dismiss
with affidavits from Schneider Canada employee Jerold Blake Cross. (R. 959-962, 975982.)
On August 24, 2006, the Gardners filed an opposition to Schneider Canada's
Motion to Dismiss, in which they made essentially the same arguments they make on this
appeal: (1) that Schneider Canada had sufficient contacts with Utah simply by placing the
control box in the "national stream of commerce," and (2) that exercising personal
4843-9530-7527.2
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jurisdiction over Schneider Canada would not offend traditional notions of substantial
justice and fair play because Schneider Canada, as an alleged "billion dollar corporation
with global reach/5 should expect to be haled into court in Utah. (R. 987-99.) On
August 31, 2006, SPX filed an opposition to Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss, in
which it argued personal jurisdiction over Schneider was proper because, SPX alleged,
Schneider Canada "transacts business in Utah." (R. 1000-1046.) On September 29,
2006, Schneider Canada filed reply memoranda addressing both the Gardners' and SPX's
opposition memoranda. (R. 1049-1156.)
On January 25, 2007, the trial court heard argument on Schneider Canada's
Motion to Dismiss.1 (R. 1223.) The trial court granted the motion and directed counsel
for Schneider Canada to prepare an order to that effect. {Id. at pp. 35-36) On April 11,
2007, the trial court signed and entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting
Schneider Canada, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ("Memorandum Opinion"), which had been approved to
form by counsel for the Gardners, SPX, and HOJ. (R. 1253-64; 2394-2405.)

The

Memorandum Opinion contained detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1

Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. ("Schneider Electric"), which the Gardners added as a
defendant in their Second Amended Complaint, also moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. (R. 182-218.) On January 25, 2007, the district court heard
argument and ruled on Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss only, not on Schneider
Electric's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 2424.) The parties later stipulated to an order
dismissing the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint against Schneider Electric on or
about April 18, 2007. (R. 1288-1293.) The district court signed and entered the order on
April 23, 2007. (R. 1294-1300.) Having been dismissed from this action by stipulation,
Schneider Electric is not a party to this appeal, nor do the Gardners pursue on appeal their
jurisdictional arguments against Schneider Electric. (See generally Br. of Appellants.)
4843-9530-7527.2
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finding Schneider Canada was not subject to either general or specific jurisdiction in the
state of Utah. A true and correct copy of the trial court's Memorandum Opinion is
attached as Addendum C. Among other things, the trial court ruled as follows:
21.
Schneider Canada is not conducting substantial
and continuous local activity in the State of Utah sufficient to
meet the requirements for this Court to confer general
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada.
22.
With regard to specific jurisdiction, while the
facts in this case indicate that Schneider Canada's actions
may fulfill one or some of the enumerated requirements set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (West 2004) ("the Utah
Long-Arm Statute"), the assertion of jurisdiction over
Schneider Canada does not comport with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Schneider
Canada does not have minimum contacts with Utah such that
the maintenance of the suit against it does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
23.
Schneider Canada's actions of manufacturing
the control box in Canada in accordance to the specifications
of the Canadian Division of Serco, and selling it to a
Canadian distributor for ultimate placement in Serco's dock
levelers is not activity sufficient to show that Schneider
Canada purposefully availed itself of conducting business in
the State of Utah.
24.
Mere awareness on the part of Schneider
Canada that some of the control boxes it manufactured would
be placed in dock levelers to be sold and used in the United
States market is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
Schneider Canada in the State of Utah.
25.
The actions of Schneider Canada of placing the
control box into the stream of commerce are not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada
26.
Schneider Canada's relationship with Square D
Company, does not establish jurisdiction over Schneider
Canada.

4843-9530-7527.2
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27.
In light of the above findings, Defendant
Schneider Canada is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
(R. 1258-59, 2399-2400.)
After the trial court's ruling dismissing their claims against Schneider Canada for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the Gardners proceeded with their case against defendants
SPX and HOJ. A jury trial was held on the Gardners' claims against SPX and HOJ from
June 8, 2009 to June 16, 2009. (R. 2195-96, 2205, 2217-22, 2255-56, and 2273-74.) On
June 16, 2009, the jury returned its verdict in which it found that: (1) SPX was not
negligent in the design of its product; (2) the dock door leveler designed and sold by SPX
did not contain a design defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (3)
HOJ was not negligent as alleged by Plaintiffs. (R. 2268-72.) A true and correct copy of
the jury's special verdict is attached hereto as Addendum D. On August 27, 2009, the
trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of SPX and HOJ and against
the Gardners. (R. 2376-2379.)
B.

Statement of Facts.
L

Schneider Canada's Marketing, Design, Manufacture,
Construction, Sale, and Distribution of the Control Box at Issue
Occurred Entirely in Canada.

Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in
Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

(R. 959, 976.)

Schneider Canada markets, designs,

manufactures, constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and
components, and did, in fact, market, design, manufacture, construct, sell, and distribute

4843-9530-7527.2
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the control box that was a component part of the dock door leveler that is the subject of
the underlying litigation. (R. 960, 976)
Schneider Canada designed the subject control box from specifications provided
by Serco's2 Canadian division.

(Id.) All communications regarding the marketing,

design, manufacture, construction, and sale of the control box at issue took place between
and amongst individuals in Canada, including but not limited to representatives of
Schneider Canada, representatives of Serco's Canadian division, and representatives of a
London, Ontario, Canada distributor, Guillevin International, Inc. ("Guillevin"). (R. 960,
981.)
Schneider Canada sold the subject control box in Canada to Guillevin, (R. 960,
977.) Guillevin then sold the subject control box in Canada to Serco's Canadian division.
(Id.) Serco's Canadian division, in turn, sold the control box to its affiliate, SPX, in the
United States. (R. 960, 803.)
2.

Schneider Canada Never Transacted Business in Utah or
Purposefully Availed Itself of the Rights and Privileges of
Conducting Business in Utah.

At the time of the marketing, design, and manufacture of the subject control box
and its sale to the Canadian distributor Guillevin, Schneider Canada was not aware that
the control box would be used in the state of Utah. (R. 961, 981.) Schneider Canada
does not do business in the state of Utah, is not registered to conduct business in the state
of Utah, and has not purposely availed itself of the rights and privileges of conducting

Serco is the predecessor-in-interest to SPX. (R. 957.)
4843-9530-7527.2
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business in Utah. (R. 961, 980.) Schneider Canada owns no property in the state of
Utah, pays no taxes, has no employees, officers, or offices in the state of Utah, and has
not had any continuous or systematic dealings with the state of Utah. (Id.) None of
Schneider Canada's shareholders resides in the state of Utah. (Id.) Schneider Canada
does not maintain telephone or facsimile listings within the state of Utah; nor does it
advertise in the state of Utah. (Id.)
Furthermore, Schneider Canada has not conducted any business, communicated,
or caused communications to occur with any consumer in the state of Utah; nor does a
substantial percentage of its sales derive from revenue generated from customers in the
state of Utah. (Id.) Schneider Canada does not render services to any customers in the
state of Utah. (R. 961, 981.) Schneider Canada has not deliberately or purposefully
designed, manufactured, constructed, distributed, or sold any product or part in the state
of Utah; nor has Schneider Canada agreed to design, manufacture, construct, distribute,
or sell any product in or from the state of Utah. (Id.)

4843-9530-7527.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated 9
OCR, may contain errors.

3.

Schneider Canada's Business Relationship Was With Serco's
Canadian Division, Not SPX.3

Contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, ^ 16), Schneider
Canada, or its predecessor, has had a business relationship with Serco's Canadian
division, not SPX, for over twenty years.

(R. 1051, 1070.)

Also contrary to the

Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, <|fl[ 17, 19), and as stated above, Schneider
Canada sold hundreds of control panels to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin, not to SPX.
(R. 1052, 1070.) Schneider Canada constructed and manufactured the control panels to
Serco's Canadian division's specifications for incorporation into its vertical dock
levelers.

(Id)

Schneider Canada worked with employees from Serco's Canadian

division, not SPX, (Br. of Appellants at 6, f 18), using Serco's design specifications,
parameters, and schematics to manufacture and produce a control panel for use in Serco's
vertical dock leveler.

Serco's control panel design would change on occasion, and

Schneider Canada would coordinate with employees from Serco's Canadian division, not
SPX, to modify the control panels to comply with any changes in the specifications,
parameters and schematics of Serco's Canadian division. (R. 1052, 1070-71.)

The next several sections contain facts that directly contradict the Gardners' Statement
of Facts concerning "Schneider Canada's Contacts and the Schneider Companies." (See
Br. of Appellants at 6-8.) To the extent there were disputes between Schneider Canada's
and the Gardners' facts, the trial court properly resolved those disputes in favor of
Schneider Canada, (see R. 1256-58, 2397-99), and Schneider Canada's facts presented
herein are entitled to deference on appeal. See Arguello v. Ind. Woodworking Machine
Co,, 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (finding that facts asserted in defendant's affidavit
are taken as true and the facts in plaintiffs complaint are considered "only to the extent
that they do not contradict the affidavit").
4843-9530-7527.2
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4,

After Selling the Control Boxes to Guillevin, Schneider Canada
Had No Control Over Where the Control Boxes Were Shipped
or Installed.

Contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, % 20), Schneider
Canada did not have control over where, when, and to whom the subject control panel
was sold. (R. 1054, 1070.) To the best of Schneider Canada's knowledge and belief, the
subject control panel and all others like it manufactured by Schneider Canada were sold
by a Canadian distributor, Guillevin, to Serco's Canadian division. (Id.) Schneider
Canada admittedly understood that some of the control panels were or would be installed
by Serco in vertical dock levelers that would be used in the United States; however,
Schneider Canada did not have knowledge of the particular states in which those vertical
dock levelers would be or were installed. (R. 1054, 1071.) Specifically, Schneider
Canada did not have knowledge of any vertical dock leveler installed in the state of Utah.
(id.)
Responding to the Gardners' assertion that Schneider Canada made a sales
presentation to SPX in Dallas, Texas, (Br. of Appellants at 6, ^ 20), the referenced
presentation was for a different product than the control panel for the vertical dock
leveler and was completely unrelated to the control panel for the vertical dock leveler.
(R. 1054-55, 1071.) Also contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6-7,
1J21), Schneider Canada does not have specific knowledge, nor did it have specific
knowledge at the time of the sale of the subject control panel, of what proportion of the
vertical dock levelers manufactured by Serco were installed in the United States. (R.
1054,1071.)
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5.

Schneider Canada, Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc., and
Square D Company Are Separate and Distinct Legal Entities,

The Gardners spend paragraphs 22 through 31 of their Statement of Facts
attempting to blur the legal distinctions between Schneider Canada, Schneider Electric,
and Square D Company4 in an attempt to establish that personal jurisdiction over one of
Schneider Canada's affiliated entities justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Schneider Canada.5 (Br. of Appellants at 7-8, ff 22-31.) The record below, which is
entitled to deference on this appeal, establishes that the entities are separate and distinct,
and the relationship between the entities is therefore not relevant to the jurisdictional
question before this Court.
Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. ("Schneider Electric") is a Delaware corporation
that operates as a holding company and has an ownership interest in Square D Company
("Square D"). (R. 537, 558.) Schneider Electric does not have any ownership interest in
Schneider Canada. (Id.) Schneider Electric is a legal entity separate and distinct from
Square D and Schneider Canada, and is not involved in the day-to-day operations of

Square D underwent a corporate name change in December 2009, but it was still known
as Square D at all relevant times. Accordingly, we refer to it as Square D throughout this
brief.
The Gardners characterize the three companies as a "global conglomerate" and refer to
them as the "Schneider Companies," even though neither term is actually used by
Schneider Canada, Square D, or Schneider Electric. (Br. of Appellants at 7, f 22.) The
Gardners improperly conflate the three entities, converting their jurisdictional argument
into an argument for piercing the corporate veil. However, they present no evidence to
support their stealth argument to pierce the corporate veil, and their attempt to cast the
three entities as one is therefore improper. Indeed, the record evidence presented herein
(and to the trial court below) shows that the three entities are separate and distinct and
that they should be treated as such under the law.
4843-9530-7527.2
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either company. (R. 538-558.) Schneider Electric has its own officers and Board of
Directors; it keeps its own books and accounting records; and it has its own bank
accounts, separate and distinct from Square D and Schneider Canada. (Id.)
Square D is a Delaware corporation that markets, designs, manufactures,
constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and components. (R. 539,
563-64.) While Square D has an ownership interest in Schneider Canada, it is a legal
entity separate and distinct from Schneider Electric and Schneider Canada. (R. 539,
563.). It has its own officers and Board of Directors; it keeps its own books accounting
records; and it has its own bank accounts separate and distinct from Schneider Electric
and Schneider Canada. (Id.) It is entirely responsible for meeting its own payroll,
providing benefits to its own employees, and paying its other business expenses. (Id.)
As stated above, Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation that markets,
designs, manufactures, constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and
components. (R. 959, 976.) Schneider Canada is a legal entity separate and distinct from
Schneider Electric and Square D and it has own Board of Directors, officers, managers,
and employees who are responsible for Schneider Canada's day-to-day business
operations. (R. 540, 564.)
The fact that Schneider Canada uses the same brands as Square D or Schneider
Electric, (Br. of Appellants at 7, ff 22, 25, 26), that Schneider Canada's website can be
accessed through Schneider Electric's website, (see id. at 7, f 27), or that Schneider
Electric's website turns up the names of distributors and a sales agent in Utah, (see id. at
8, f 29), is not determinative of the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
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Schneider Canada. Likewise, the fact that Square D has offices in Utah, is registered as a
corporation in Utah, and has a registered agent in Utah, (Br. of Appellants at 8, TJ 30), is
not determinative of the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider
Canada, a subsidiary of Square D.

Finally, the fact that one of Square D's other

subsidiaries, EFI Electronics, was advertising for jobs in Utah, (Br. of Appellants at 8,
If 31), has no bearing on the jurisdictional question as it relates to Schneider Canada.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly granted Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction because Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation with no place
of business, or any other significant presence, in the state of Utah. Moreover, Schneider
Canada's marketing, design, manufacture, construction, distribution, and sale of the
control panel that was a component part of the SPX dock door leveler that allegedly
caused Aaron Gardner's injury occurred entirely in Canada. Thus, the Gardners cannot
show that Schneider Canada has minimum contacts with Utah such that maintenance of
the Gardners' lawsuit against Schneider Canada in Utah does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice
The Gardners' argument that Schneider Canada is subject to the specific personal
jurisdiction of a Utah court under a "stream of commerce" theory fails under the
controlling law and the record evidence. To establish personal jurisdiction under the
"stream of commerce" theory, the Gardners must show that Schneider Canada took
deliberate steps specifically to serve the state of Utah with the control panel that was a
component part of the dock door leveler that is the subject of the underlying lawsuit.
4843-9530-7527.2
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Furthermore, Schneider Canada's mere awareness that its product may ultimately be used
in dock door levelers installed in the United States is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
in the Utah courts under this theory. The Gardners cannot prevail under this theory
because the record evidence establishes that Schneider Canada did not take any steps
whatsoever to serve the Utah market such that it could reasonably foresee being haled
into a Utah court.
The Gardners' argument that Schneider Canada is subject to the specific personal
jurisdiction of a Utah court under a "corporate conglomerate" theory also fails as a matter
of law.

In essence, the Gardners argue that Schneider Canada is subject to the

jurisdiction of Utah courts by virtue of its affiliation with Square D (Schneider Canada's
parent company) and Schneider Electric (Square D's parent company). However, in
order to establish an alter-ego relationship for jurisdictional purposes, the Gardners must
show there exists a unity of interest between Schneider Canada, Square D, and Schneider
Electric that is so substantial as to warrant the disregard of those entities' corporate
identities. According to the cases cited in their own brief, the Gardners must show that
the parent exercises significant control over the subsidiary corporation's day-to-day
operations and internal affairs, or that the parent is using the subsidiary corporation to
perpetrate a fraud. The Gardners have made no effort whatsoever to satisfy this veilpiercing standard, and disregard of Sclineider Canada's corporate identity for
jurisdictional purposes is therefore improper.
Finally, even if this Court were to disagree with the trial court's personal
jurisdiction ruling, the Court should still affirm the dismissal of the claims against
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Schneider Canada because the jury's disposition of the claims against the other
defendants below renders the claims against Schneider Canada moot. Thus, remanding
this matter to the trial court for litigation against Schneider Canada would be futile. This
Court should affirm the jury verdict, and the judgment below that is based on the verdict,
for reasons co-appellees SPX and HOJ will explain in their briefs. The jury found that
SPX's dock door leveler did not contain a design defect that made the product
unreasonably dangerous.

Because Schneider Canada's control panel was simply a

component part of SPX's dock door leveler, the Gardners are collaterally estopped by the
jury verdict from pursuing their defective design claims against Schneider Canada. Thus
their claims against Schneider Canada are moot, and reversing and remanding based on
the trial court's personal jurisdiction ruling would be futile. If necessary, this Court can
and should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the claims against Schneider Canada on
this alternative ground.
ARGUMENT
L

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Because the trial court made its decision concerning personal jurisdiction over

Schneider Canada based upon affidavits, an appeal from that decision presents only legal
questions that are reviewed for correctness. Phone Directories Co,, Inc. v. Henderson,
2000 UT 64, f 2, 8 P.3d 256 (citing Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mack Co., 838
P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992)). However, because the Gardners did not controvert
Schneider Canada's version of the jurisdictional facts in the trial court below, "for
purposes of this appeal, the facts asserted in [Schneider Canada's] affidavits] are taken
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as true and the facts recited in the complaint are considered only to the extent that they do
not contradict the affidavits]." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1121.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER SCHNEIDER CANADA.
The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting Schneider Canada's

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is generally
divided into two categories: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.

Arguello,

838 P.2d at 1122. The Gardners do not argue on this appeal that the trial court should
have exercised general jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. Instead, they argue it should
have exercised specific jurisdiction over Schneider Canada.
In order to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada, the
Gardners must show that "(1) the Utah long-arm statute extends to [Schneider Canada's]
acts or contacts, (2) [the Gardners'] claim arises out of those acts or contacts, and (3) the
exercise of jurisdiction satisfies [Schneider Canada's] right to due process under the
United States Constitution." Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth, 2007 UT App 225, f 6,
164 P.3d 1272 (quoting Fenn v. Meads Enters., Inc., 2006 UT 8, f 8, 137 P.3d 706). As
the trial court correctly found, the Gardners cannot show that the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is warranted.
A.

The Gardners Cannot Show that Schneider Canada's Acts or Contacts
Fall Within the Utah Long-Arm Statute,

The Gardners fail to present evidence from the record below to establish that
Schneider Canada falls within the reach of the Utah long-arm statute. The Utah long-arm
statute provides, in pertinent part:

4843-9530-7527.2
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Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, who, in person or through an agent, does any of the
following of the enumerated acts is subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or
related to:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; [or]

(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether
tortuous or by breach of warranty.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205.6

The Gardners first argue that Schneider Canada's

conduct falls within Utah's long-arm statute because the control panel manufactured by
Schneider Canada "failed and was a cause of Mr. Gardner's death." (Br. of Appellants at
p. 13.) The Gardners cite to the testimony of Sergeant Nunnelley and their expert, Fred
Smith, to support this assertion. {Id. at 3-5.) The jury's factual findings, however,
directly contradict the Gardners' assertion. The jury answered "No" to question number
three on the special verdict form: "Did Defendant SPX Corporation manufacture and sell
a product that contained a design defect that made the product unreasonably
dangerous?" (R. 2269 (emphasis added).) Schneider Canada's control box was only a
component part of the end product, SPX's dock door leveler. The jury's finding that the
dock door leveler did not contain a design defect necessarily encompasses all of its
component parts, including Schneider Canada's control box. Thus, it would be incorrect
to hold that Schneider Canada is subject to Utah's long-arm statute because its control
box did not cause the subject injury.

At the time the trial court made its decision on Schneider Canada's Motion to dismiss in
2007, the Utah long-arm statute was numbered Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
4843-9530-7527.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

The Gardners next contend Schneider Canada's conduct falls within the Utah
long-arm statute because Schneider Canada "transacted business" in Utah.

(Br. of

Appellants at p. 13.) Because the Gardners cannot show Schneider Canada itself actually
transacted any business in Utah, they must base their argument on the fact that Schneider
Canada is "a subsidiary of Square D, amd part of the global Schneider Electric
conglomerate."

(Id)

The law is clear, however, that "jurisdiction over a parent

corporation [Square D] does not automatically establish jurisdiction over a subsidiary
corporation [Schneider Canada]." Keeton v. Hustier Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.
13 (1984). Thus, as detailed further below in Section 11(B)(2), the fact that Schneider
Canada is a subsidiary of Square D, which is a subsidiary of Schneider Electric, does not,
in an of itself, establish personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada.
Because the Gardners cannot establish Schneider Canada engaged in any of the
acts enumerated by the Utah long-arm statute, the Court's inquiry into the jurisdictional
question is ended. As explained in the following section, however, even if the Gardners
were able to satisfy the Utah long-arm statute, they cannot show that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada comports with Schneider Canada's right to
due process under the Constitution.
B«

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Schneider Canada Does Not
Comport with Due Process.

Although Schneider Canada's activities are outside the reach of the Utah long-arm
statute, federal due process also precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Schneider Canada.
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personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must have had
'minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Parry v. Ernst Home
Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (citing Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985); InVl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). "Further, the defendants' 'conduct and connection with the forum state [must
be] such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The court
must examine whether the defendant corporation has "purposefully availed" itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Id
In this case, Schneider Canada does not have the required minimum contacts with
the state of Utah sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Indeed, Schneider Canada's contacts
with Utah are virtually non-existent and certainly would not allow Schneider Canada
reasonably to anticipate being haled into court in Utah. As set forth above, Schneider
Canada is located and operates in Canada. It maintains no offices, owns no property, and
has no employees in the State of Utah. Moreover, the subject control box in this case—
which is only a component part of the dock door leveler Serco manufactured—was
designed, manufactured, and constructed in Canada by Schneider Canada. The control
box was then sold in Canada to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin. Neither the general
activities of Schneider Canada (which operates not only outside Utah, but outside the
United States), nor its specific activities with regard to the subject control box component
part (which was designed, manufactured and sold not only outside of Utah but outside of
4843-9530-7527.2
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the United States) can be considered contacts sufficient enough to hold Schneider Canada
purposefully availed itself of the laws of Utah. To confer jurisdiction on Schneider
Canada anywhere in the United States, let alone in Utah, would certainly violate the
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
To support their claim that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider
Canada comports with the due process requirements of the Constitution, the Gardners
advance the same arguments the trial court already rejected below. First, the Gardners
claim the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper under a
"stream of commerce theory." (Br. of Appellants at 14-20.) Second, the Gardners claim
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper because Schneider
Canada is part of a global conglomerate of entities, some of which transact business in
Utah. (Br. of Appellants at 20-23.) As detailed in the following sections, neither of the
Gardners' arguments warrants the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider
Canada under the Due Process Clause.
1.

Schneider Canada is not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Merely
Because It Placed the Control Box Component in the Stream of
Commerce in Canada.

The Gardners argue that because Schneider Canada put the control box component
part into the stream of commerce, it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah
courts. This is simply not the case. The "stream of commerce" theory is based on the
premise that "[o]ne who puts a product into the stream of commerce in such a fashion as
to reasonably foresee its sale in a certain jurisdiction cannot complain of having to defend
against claims in that jurisdiction arising out of the product's presence there." Arguello,

4843-9530-7527.2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated2OCR,
may contain errors.
1

838 P.2d at 1124. Merely putting the product into the stream of commerce is not
sufficient; 'the defendant must have taken deliberate steps to serve the forum state
market with the product that is the subject of the suit before being susceptible to
jurisdiction in that state." Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, as articulated by Justice O'Connor in Asahi Metal Industry Co.,
Ltd v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987):
The placement of a product in to the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the
defendant may indicate intent or purpose to serve the market
in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum state,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to
customers in the forum State, or marketing the product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent
in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the
product in to the stream into an act purposefully directed
toward the forum State.
Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
In Asahi, the foreign Japanese defendant manufactured a component part (in that
case, a tire valve) which was then placed into a completed Taiwanese product in Taiwan
and shipped by the Taiwanese company to California. The Supreme Court found that the
plaintiff had not demonstrated any action by the Japanese tire valve manufacturer to
purposefully avail itself of the California market, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Superior Court of California was therefore improper. Id.
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Here, as in Asahi, Schneider Canada designed and manufactured a component part
of the Serco dock door leveler—the control box. That component part was designed,
manufactured, and sold only in Canada to a Canadian distributor.

Indeed, all

communications regarding the design, manufacture, and sale of the control box took
place entirely in Canada. The control box component part was then sold to Serco in
Canada, and Serco then brought it into the United States.
While it is certainly clear that Serco/SPX took deliberate steps to serve the market
in Utah, the same cannot be said for Schneider Canada, whose activities all occurred in
Canada. Schneider Canada itself made no effort and took no steps to put the control box
component part into the stream of commerce in the United States—those steps were all
taken by Serco's Canadian division after Schneider Canada had sold the part to the
Canadian distributor. Schneider Canada, like the defendants in AsahU only manufactured
a component part of a finished complete product that was then distributed by some other,
unrelated, entity. Schneider Canada cannot be held to have reasonably anticipated being
haled in to Court in Utah because it sold no control boxes in Utah and did not seek to
serve the Utah market. See Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1125. Accordingly, jurisdiction cannot
be conferred over Schneider Canada based on a stream of commerce theory.
The Gardners go to great lengths to distinguish this case from Parry and Arguello,
both of which were cases in which the Utah Supreme Court found lack of personal
jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory. (Br. of Appellants at 18-20.) In order
to make their distinctions of the two cases work, however, the Gardners must rely on
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incorrect facts from the record below, and they must ignore key factors upon which the
Parry and Arguello Courts ruled.
As to the Gardners' incorrect assertions of fact, the Gardners claim Schneider
Canada dealt directly with SPX. (Br. of Appellants at 18.)7 The record below, however,
establishes Schneider Canada sold the control panels to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin,
which eventually sold them to Serco's Canadian division. Serco's Canadian division
then distributed them to its United States affiliate, SPX. The Gardners' version of the
facts incorrectly ignores the channels through which Schneider Canada's control panel
actually passed. The Court should reject the Gardners' attempt to bolster their stream of
commerce theory by distorting the record below.
The Gardners must also ignore important similarities between this case and the
cases of Parry and Arguello to make their "stream of commerce theory" fit.

The

Gardners claim the Japanese defendants in Parry "claimed they had no knowledge of
where their mauls would be sold." (Br. of Appellants at 19.) To the contrary, it is clear
from the Parry opinion itself that the Japanese defendants were informed of sales in the
Western United States, but "they neither came to Utah nor sent sales representatives to
Utah to facilitate the marketing and purchase of their product." Parry, 779 P.2d at 666.

The Gardners also argue Schneider Canada representatives visited Serco in the United
States (Texas, not Utah), and Schneider Canada does not dispute that. Such visit,
however, was unrelated to the control panels for the vertical dock levelers. Accordingly,
and as the Gardners fail to note, Aaron Gardner's injuries could not have arisen out of or
been related to the Texas contact. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985). Moreover, this visit to Texas for an unrelated product does not lead to the
Gardners' unsupported legal conclusion that Schneider Canada could reasonably expect
to be sued in Utah.
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The Parry Court also found important that the Japanese defendants did not "show special
designing for Utah's market, advertis[e] in Utah, establish[] channels for providing
regular advice to customers in Utah, or market[] the product through a distributor who
has agreed to act as a sales agent in Utah." Id, Here, even if it can be alleged that
Schneider Canada expected that some of its control panels could be used in dock door
levelers installed in the United States, Schneider Canada, like the Japanese defendants in
Parry, did not take any active steps to sell or market its product in Utah, and the
Gardners'stream of commerce theory fails.
Key similarities between this case and Arguello also preclude specific personal
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. The Arguello Court found it important that the outof-state defendant "did not seek to serve the Utah market . . . through either sales
representatives or advertising." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1125. Moreover, the machine in
Arguello was sold in California, making it unforeseeable that the machine would be
resold in Utah. Id. In this case, Schneider Canada likewise did not actively seek to serve
the Utah market. It did not sell its product directly into the Utah market. Rather,
Schneider Canada sold its control panels to a Canadian distributor in Canada, who then
sold the control panels to another Canadian company, who ultimately sold the control
panels to SPX. Schneider Canada had no control over and could not reasonably foresee
where its control panels would end up once it sold them to Guillevin, the Canadian
distributor.
In sum, there is no meanginful distinction between the case at hand and Parry and
Arguello. As in Parry and Arguello, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider
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Canada under a "stream of commerce" theory in this case is improper.

Schneider

Canada's mere awareness that its control panels could be used on dock door levelers in
the United States is insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Because
Schneider Canada did not take any deliberate steps at any time to serve the Utah market,
the Gardners' stream of commerce theory of jurisdiction fails as a matter of law, as the
trial court correctly held.
2.

Schneider Canada is not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Under
the Garders' Corporate Conglomerate Theory.

The Gardners also argue specific personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is
proper because Schneider Canada's parent, Square D, allegedly has "minimum contacts"
in Utah, and because Schneider Canada is "part of a multi-national conglomerate." (Br.
of Appellants at 20-23.) In essence, the Gardners are attempting to bootstrap Schneider
Canada into this action by way of its affiliation with related corporate entities, including,
but not limited to, Schneider Canada's parent company, Square D, and Square D's parent
company, Schneider Electric.

The Gardners' corporate conglomerate theory of

jurisdiction has no support in the law.
The Supreme Court has stated that jurisdiction over a parent corporation does not
automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary. See Keeton, 465
U.S. at 770. Jurisdiction over two related defendants is generally only proper if the
requirements of Int'l Shoe are met for both. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)
(concluding that each corporation's contacts with the forum state must be assessed
individually).
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Schneider Canada, itself, does not have minimum contacts with the state of Utah,
and imputing the contacts of its parent company, Square D, to Schneider Canada is
unwarranted. As set forth above, Schneider Canada is a subsidiary of Square D. Square
D is a subsidiary of Schneider Electric. Square D is not a defendant in this action and did
not market, manufacture, construct, sell, or distribute the control box at issue.
Accordingly, jurisdiction over Schneider Canada can only be judged on its own contacts
with the state of Utah and must be determined based on an analysis of whether the due
process requirements are met for Schneider Canada, not for Square D or Schneider
Electric.
The Gardners blur the distinction between Schneider Canada and related corporate
entities in support of their corporate conglomerate theory of jurisdiction. They do so by
commingling Schneider Canada with these related corporate entities (e.g., Square D) and
various trade names (e.g., Telemecanique) and then labeling Schneider Canada as "part
of a multi-national conglomerate." (Br. of Appellant at 22-23.) The Gardners claim that
a Schneider Electric website that links to Square D's and Schneider Canada's websites is
proof that the entities are essentially one in the same and should be treated as such for
jurisdictional purposes. (Br. of Appellants at 22.)
The Gardners, however, ignore the very case law upon which they rely to support
the corporate conglomerate theory. That case law, which the Gardners cite on pages 20
and 21 of their brief, requires them to demonstrate a basis for piercing the corporate veil
before this Court may disgregard the separate and distinct identities of Schneider Canada,
Square D, and Schneider Electric. To illustrate what a difficult burden the Gardners bear
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in piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the corporate form for jurisdictional
purposes, it is important to note that in only two of the seven cases the Gardners cite did
the court actually find there was enough evidence to pierce the corporate veil of a related
entity. In one such case, In re Cyclobenzaprine, 693 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D. Del. 2010), the
court pierced the corporate veil based on evidence that the entities shared the same
business address and some of the same employees. Id. at 420. The same cannot be said
of Schneider Canada, Square D, and Schneider Electric.

In another case, Patin v.

Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 29A F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2002), the court pierced the
corporate veil of a successor corporation that was a "mere continuation of its predecessor
corporation." Id. at 654. Again, there are no facts here that Schneider Canada is a mere
continuation of either Square D or Schneider Electric. In the other five cases cited by the
Gardners, the courts found insufficient evidence to justify disregard of the corporate
form.8

Indeed, in those cases, the courts required much more of a connection to substantiate an
alter ego relationship than what the Gardners allege here (i.e. links on websites,
marketing similar brands, etc.). See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation,
674 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598-602 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that Mars Global and Mars
Canada maintained distinct corporate entities and there was therefore no evidence of an
alter ego relationship between the companies; also stating that "the level of control
necessary to substantiate an alter ego relationship must exceed the usual supervision that
a parent exercises over a subsidiary"); Harte-Hanks Direct Marketing/Baltimore, Inc. v.
Varilease Tech. Fin. Group, 299 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514-15 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to
pierce the corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes because plaintiff could not show
defendant used the corporate entities to perpetuate a fraud); Gordon v. Greenview Hosp.,
Inc., 300 S.W.3d 635, 653-54 (Tenn. 2009) (declining to disregard the corporate identity
of parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes where plaintiff failed to allege that
parent exercised complete control of subsidiary's internal affairs or daily operations);
BMC Software Belgium, N. V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798-99 (Tex. 2002) (plaintiff
4843-9530-7527.2
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The Gardners do not even bother to set forth the standard for piercing the
corporate veil in Utah, let alone present facts to satisfy the standard. In order to pierce
the corporate veil in Utah, a plaintiff must meet the following two part test:
(1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of
one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
an inequitable result would follow.
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979) (emphasis
added).

It is not enough that the subsidiary corporation did not have a separate

personality; a plaintiff must also show that the parent caused the subsidiary to be used to
perpetrate a fraud. Baldwin v. Matthew R. White Inv., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1054, 1055-56
(D.Utahl987). 9

failed to show parent controlled the internal business operations and affairs of the
subsidiary, which is the showing required to "'fuse' the parent company and its
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes"); Hobbs v. Don Mealey Chevrolet, Inc., 642 So.2d
1149, 1156-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the corporate veil cannot be pierced
for jurisdictional purposes absent a showing of improper conduct, which plaintiff had
failed to make).
The Gardners do not seek to satisfy any of the veil-piercing tests enumerated in the cases
they cite. For example, they do not claim Square D controlled Schneider Canada's
internal business operations or affairs, or used Schneider Canada to perpetrate a fraud. In
short, the Gardners have failed to allege any facts that would justify the application of the
extreme remedy of veil-piercing.
9

Utah courts view piercing the corporate veil under an alter ego theory as a severe action
that courts should undertake only rarely, in the most extreme circumstances. Compare
Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576 (10th Cir. 1990)
("[Corporate veils exist for a reason and should be pierced only reluctantly and
cautiously.").
4843-9530-7527.2
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Utah courts look primarily to the following factors to determine whether to
disregard the corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes:
(1)
whether distinct and adequately capitalized financial
units are incorporated and maintained;
(2)
whether daily operations of the two corporations are
separate;
(3)
whether formal barriers between management of the
two entities are erected, with each functioning in its own best
interests;
(4)
whether those with whom the corporations come in
contact are apprised of their separate identity;
(5)
whether the corporation was used as a fa?ade for
operations of the dominant shareholder; and
(6)
the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or
fraud.
Id. (citations omitted); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
An examination of the Gardners' alleged evidence shows none of those factors is
present here. The exclusive basis of the Gardners' alter ego claims is the following: (1)
"Schneider Electric owns an Internet website which has a link to Schneider Canada,
Schneider Holdings, Square D, as well as other affiliates and markets"; (2) "[t]he
Schneider

Companies

maintain

an

English-language

website

marketing

the

Telemecanique brand of product that was used . . . in the Control Panel"; (3) "[t]he
Schneider Companies maintain scores of virtually identically websites geared towards
marketing and selling their products"; (4) Schneider Electric's website produces "a list of
16 distributors in Utah, one sales agent in Utah, and an electronic catalog of
Telemecanique products"; (5) "Square D maintains an office in Utah, is registered as a
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corporation in Utah, and has a registered agent in Utah"; and (6) "Schneider Electric was
advertising for jobs in Utah . . . with EFI Electronics, which was another one of Square
D's subsidiaries," prior to the district court's ruling granting Schneider Canada's Motion
to Dismiss. (Br. of Appellants at 22.)
Noticeably absent from the Gardners' brief are any allegations that either
Schneider Electric or Square D treats Schneider Canada as its alter ego. For example, the
Gardners do not allege that either Schneider Electric or Square D commingles funds with
Schneider Canada, that either Schneider Electric or Square D controls the day-to-day
operations of Schneider Canada, or that either Schneider Electric or Square D uses
Schneider Canada as a fa9ade or to perpetrate a fraud.

To the contrary, the record

evidence shows Schneider Canada has its own Board of Directors, officers, managers,
and employees, who are responsible for the day-to-day business operations of Schneider
Canada. It establishes Schneider Canada is a wholly separate and autonomous business
entity from that of Square D and Schneider Electric. Accordingly, there is no basis to
pierce the corporate veil and disregard the corporate form for jurisdictional purposes.
3*

Balancing the Convenience of the Parties and the Interests of the
State of Utah Dictates That the Court Should Not Assume
Jurisdiction Over Schneider Canada.

As set forth in Parry, when considering the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation, the courts "must also examine '|w]hether the cause of action arises out of or
has a substantial connection with the activity [in the forum state] and [whether there was
a] balancing of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the State in assuming
jurisdiction.'" Parry, 779 P.2d at 662 (citing Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110). In making
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this examination, there are "important differences between assertions of jurisdiction in
the interstate context and those in the international context." Id. As Parry discusses,
courts have recognized "the inconvenience placed upon international defendants when
balanced against the forum state's interest in litigating the plaintiffs claims: 'The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of
personal jurisdiction over national borders.'" Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114
(emphasis added)).
There is no doubt Schneider Canada, as a Canadian corporation, "faces substantial
inconvenience in litigating in a foreign forum." Parry, 779 P.2d at 668. Moreover, while
Schneider Canada recognizes the "interests of the state to 'provide its citizens with an
effective means of redress,'" in this case, this Court can successfully balance what
appears to be conflicting interests. Id. Here—as opposed to other cases where the
plaintiffs only redress lies against a foreign defendant—the Gardners tried their case
against the defendant that manufactured the dock door leveler actually implicated in Mr.
Gardner's death as well as the defendant that installed such dock door leveler.
The fact that the Gardners had their redress against the other defendants in Utah
Court balanced against the formidable inconvenience of Schneider Canada having to
defend a lawsuit in a state where it does not have sufficient minimum contacts must lead
to the conclusion that Schneider Canada should not be obligated to defend a case in this
state where its contacts are "insignificant and insufficient to incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection.'" Parry, 779 P.2d at 668 (citations omitted). Placing
4843-9530-7527.2
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this large burden on Schneider Canada, given the lack of its minimum contacts here in
Utah and the fact the Gardners brought in defendants from whom they could properly
seek damages, clearly violates the due process clause and the notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
To conclude, the trial court correctly ruled the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Schneider Canada does not comport with due process under either the Gardners'
"stream of commerce" or "corporate conglomerate" theories. Moreover, the balance of
the convenience of the parties weighs against exercising personal jurisdiction over
Schneider Canada. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting
Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
IIL

THE GARDNERS' CLAIMS AGAINST SCHNEIDER CANADA ARE
MOOT IN ANY EVENT BECAUSE THE JURY VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE JURY VERDICT COLLATERALLY
ESTOP THE GARDNERS FROM PROVING ANY OF THEIR CLAIMS
AGAINST SCHNEIDER CANADA,
Even if this Court were to conclude the trial court's personal jurisdiction ruling

was error, it should still affirm the dismissal of the claims against Schneider Canada
because the record in the trial court demonstrates without question that those claims are
moot. That is because the jury's findings in its special verdict exonerating SPX and HOJ
collaterally estop the Gardners from proving their claims against Schneider Canada.10
Thus, reversing and remanding the dismissal of those claims would be futile, and the
Court should not do so. See, e.g., Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, f^f 130-137,

10

This Court should affirm the jury verdict and the trial court's resulting judgment for
reasons co-appellees, SPX and HOJ, will explain in their briefs.
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82 P.3d 1076 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim on alternative ground that jury verdict
in trial below had destroyed an essential factual predicate for fraud claim, thus rendering
claim moot and precluding reversal or remand); see also Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 16, 48 P.3d 968 ("[W]e will not adjudicate issues when
the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed moot when the requested judicial
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101,
1J25, 16P.3dl233).
Following the dismissal of Schneider Canada on jurisdictional grounds, there was
a full-blown jury trial below, which resulted in a complete defense verdict in favor of
SPX and HOJ. In its verdict, the jury specifically found the dock door leveler designed
and sold by SPX did not contain a design defect that made the product unreasonably
dangerous.

This verdict necessarily encompasses Schneider Canada's control panel

because the control panel was simply a component part of the end product—the dock
door leveler. Therefore, even if the Court finds the trial court incorrectly ruled on the
jurisdictional question as to Schneider Canada, the jury's verdict and the resulting
judgment collaterally estop the Gardners from proceeding and recovering against
Schneider Canada.
In Utah, collateral estoppel "is a judicially-created doctrine that 'prevents parties
or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully
litigated in the first suit.'" Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, f 29, 232 P.3d 1059
(internal citation omitted).

To invoke collateral estoppel, a party must show the

following elements:
4843-9530-7527.2
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(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to
the one presented in the instant action; (2) the party against
whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity
with a party, to the prior adjudication; (3) the issue in the first
action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the
first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. Utah does not require mutuality of parties for collateral estoppel to apply. Nielson v.
Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) (stating the "rule is that a stranger to a
judgment may assert a judgment against one who actually litigated an issue that was
necessarily decided by the judgment and thereby preclude the relitigation of the same
issue"); see also Robertson v. Campbell, 614 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983) ("It is not
necessary that the parties who assert collateral estoppel against one who lost the issue in a
prior case were also parties to the first action."). Schneider Canada, therefore, is not
precluded from invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine simply because it was dismissed
early on in the underlying litigation and did not ultimately participate in the jury trial.
The jury verdict and judgment based on the jury verdict preclude the Gardners
from relitigating their design defect claims against Schneider Canada. Here, the second
through fourth elements that are necessary to invoke collateral estoppel cannot be
disputed: as to the second element, the Gardners were parties to the proceedings below;
as to the third element, the issue of whether the dock door leveler contained a design
defect was fully and fairly litigated through the jury trial; and, as to the fourth element,
the jury trial resulted in a jury verdict and final judgment based on the jury verdict. Thus,
the only element from Gudmundson that requires further analysis is the first element—
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whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the
instant action.
Here, in the event the Court finds the district court incorrectly ruled upon the
jurisdictional question, the remaining issues left to be litigated against Schneider Canada
would be identical to the issue the Gardners already litigated and lost against SPX. One
of the main issues the Gardners litigated through trial against SPX was whether the dock
door leveler that allegedly caused Aaron Gardner's injury contained a design defect that
made the product unreasonably dangerous. (R. 2269.) The jury found for SPX on this
issue by concluding that the dock door leveler did not contain a design defect that made it
unreasonably dangerous. (Id.) Because Schneider Canada's product, the control panel,
was merely a component part of the dock door leveler, it is encompassed within the jury's
verdict. In other words, the Gardners are collaterally estopped from relitigating whether
Schneider Canada's control panel had a design defect because it is only a small piece of
the overall product—the dock door leveler—that the jury already found to be not
defective.
In sum, the jury's finding that the SPX dock door leveler did not contain a design
defect collaterally estops the Gardners from asserting that the Schneider Control Panel—
which was merely part of that dock door leveler—was defective. Thus, regardless of the
correctness of the trial court's jurisdictional ruling, this Court should decline to remand
the Gardners' claims against Schneider Canada for further proceedings because those
claims are moot. This result accords with well-established appellate jurisprudence in
Utah countenancing against the revival and remand of claims that can no longer impact
4843-9530-7527.2
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the rights of the litigants. See, e.g., Jensen, 2003 UT 51,fflf130-137 (affirming dismissal
of fraud claim on alternative ground that jury verdict in trial below had destroyed an
essential factual predicate for fraud claim, thus rendering claim moot and precluding
reversal or remand); Brookside Mobile Home Park, 2002 UT 48, ^ 16 ("[W]e will not
adjudicate issues when the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed moot when
the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting Ellis v.
Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ^ 25, 16 P.3d 1233).
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Gardners' claims against Schneider
Canada. The trial court correctly dismissed Schneider Canada from this action for lack of
personal jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm that decision in all respects.
Alternatively, the Gardners' claims against Schneider Canada are now moot because the
jury verdict and resulting judgment exonerating SPX and HOJ collaterally estop the
Gardners from asserting Schneider Canada's control panel was defective.

Thus,

reversing and remanding the claims against Schenider Canada for further proceedings
would be futile, and the Court should not do so.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2010.

^
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JUDICIAL CODE

(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the
personal representatives or heirs of the person who dies may
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence
other than the testimony of the injured person.
(3) This section may not be construed to be retroactive.
2009

78B-3-201

(8) (a) A merchant demanding payment of a penalty under
Subsection (4) or (5) shall give written notice to the person
or persons from whom the penalty is sought. The notice
shall state:
"IMPORTANT NOTICE: The payment of any penalty
demanded of you does not prevent criminal prosecution
under a related criminal provision."
(b) This notice shall be boldly and conspicuously displayed, in at least the same size type as is used in the
demand, and shall be sent with the demand for payment
of the penalty described in Subsection (4) or (5).
(9) The provision of Section 78B-8-201 requiring that compensatory or general damages be awarded in order to award
punitive damages does not prohibit an award of a penalty
under Subsection (4) or (5) whether or not restitution has been
paid to the merchant either prior to or as part of a civil action.

78B-3-108. Shoplifting — Merchant's rights — Civil
liability for shoplifting by adult or minor —
Criminal conviction not a prerequisite for
civil liability — Written notice required for
penalty demand.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Merchandise" has the same meaning as provided
in Section 76-6-601.
(b) "Merchant" has the same meaning as provided in
Section 76-6-601.
2008
(c) "Minor" has the same meaning as provided in Sec78B-3-109. Right to life — State policy — Act or omistion 76-6-601.
sion preventing abortion not actionable —
(d) "Premises" has the same meaning as "retail merFailure or refusal to prevent birth not a decantile establishment" found in Section 76-6-601.
fense.
(e) "Wrongful taking of merchandise" has the same
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public
meaning as "retail theft" as described in Section 76-6-602.
policy of this state to encourage all persons to respect the right
(2) A merchant may request an individual on his premises
to life of ail other persons, regardless of age, development,
to place or keep in full view any merchandise the individual
condition, or dependency, including all persons with a disabilmay have removed, or which the merchant has reason to
ity and all unborn persons.
believe the individual may have removed, from its place of
display or elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase, or
(2) A cause of action may not arise, and damages may not be
for any other reasonable purpose. The merchant may not be
awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but
criminally or civilly liable for having made the request.
for the act or omission of another, a person would not have
been permitted to have been born alive but would have been
(3) A merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise
aborted.
has been wrongfully taken by an individual and that the
merchant can recover the merchandise by taking the individ(3) The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live
ual into custody and detaining the individual may, for the
birth of a person may not be a defense in any action, and may
purpose of attempting to recover the merchandise or for the
not be considered in awarding damages or child support, or
purpose of informing a peace officer of the circumstances of the
imposing a penalty, in any action.
2008
detention, take the individual into custody and detain the
78B-3-110. Defense to civil action for damages resultindividual in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length
ing from commission of crime.
of time. Neither the merchant nor the merchant's employee
(1) A person may not recover from the victim of a crime for
may be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false
personal injury or property damage if the person:
imprisonment, slander, or unlawful detention or for any other
(a) entered the property of the victim with criminal
type of claim or action unless the custody and detention are
intent and the injury or damage occurred while the person
unreasonable under all the circumstances.
was on the victim's property; or
(4) An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise is liable in
(b) committed a crime against the victim, during which
a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to
the damage or injury occurred.
the merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchan(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not apply if the
dise not to exceed $1,000, plus an additional penalty as
person can prove by clear and convincing evidence that:
determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than
(a) his actions did not constitute a felony; and
$500, plus court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
(b) his culpability was less than the person from whom
(5) A minor who wrongfully takes merchandise and the
recovery is sought.
minor's parents or legal guardian are jointly and severally
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to any next-of-kin, heirs, or
liable in a civil action to the merchant for:
personal representatives of the person if the person is disabled
(a) actual damages;
or killed.
(b) a penalty to the merchant in the amount of the
(4) Subsections (1), (2), and (3) do not apply if the person
retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $500 plus an
committing or attempting to commit the crime has clearly
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less
retreated from the criminal activity.
than $50 nor more than $500; and
(5) "Clearly retreated" means that the person committing
(c) court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
the criminal act has fully, clearly, and immediately ceased all
(6) A parent or guardian is not liable for damages under
hostile, threatening, violent, or criminal behavior or activity.
this section if the parent or guardian made a reasonable effort
2008
to restrain the wrongful taking and reported it to the merchant involved or to the law enforcement agency having
primary jurisdiction once the parent or guardian knew of the
PART 2
minor's unlawful act. A report is not required under this
section if the minor was arrested or apprehended by a peace
NONRESIDENT JURISDICTION ACT
officer or by anyone acting on behalf of the merchant involved.
78B-3-201. Title — Purpose.
(7) A conviction in a criminal action of shoplifting is not a
(1) This part is known as the "Nonresident Jurisdiction
condition precedent to a civil action authorized under Subsection (4) or (5).
Act." Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2) It is declared, as a matter of legislative policy, that the
ibiic interest demands the state provide its citizens with an
fective means of redress against nonresident persons, who,
irough certain significant minimal contacts with this state,
cur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection,
lis legislative action is necessary because of technological
ogress which has substantially increased the flow of comerce between the several states resulting in increased intertion between persons of this state and persons of other
ates.
(3) The provisions of this part, to ensure maximum protec>n to citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert
risdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
rmitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendmt to the United States Constitution.
2008
B-3-202. Definitions.
A.s used in this part:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm,
company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this
state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents,
or representatives in this state which affect persons or
businesses within the state.
2008
B-3-203. Sworn certificate of nonresident doing
business here.
1) Any nonresident person, other than insurance organiions, doing business in this state in one or more places shall
a sworn certificate with the Division of Corporations and
nmercial Code.
2) The certificate shall contain the name and address of
manager, superintendent, or agent in this state upon
Dm service of process may be had in any action arising out
he conduct of the business.
2008
5-3-204. Effect of failure to file certificate — Service
of process u p o n nonresident.
r
a nonresident person doing business as provided in
tion 78B-3-203 fails to file a certificate, or the manager,
erintendent, or agent designated in the certificate cannot
bund within the state, service of process may be made by
ring any person employed by or acting as an agent for the
resident.
2008
1-3-205. Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
otwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, any person or peril representative of the person, whether or not a citizen or
dent of this state, who, in person or through an agent, does
of the following enumerated acts is subject to the jurision of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of
slated to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in this
state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78B,

882

Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act, to determine
paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for
child support.
2008
78B-3-206. Service of process.
(1) Service of process on any party outside the state may be
made pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Service of summons and of a copy of the complaint, if
any, may also be made upon any person located without this
state by any individual over 21 years of age, not a party to the
action, with the same force and effect as though the summons
had been personally served within this state. No order of court
is required. An affidavit of the server shall be filed with the
court stating the time, manner and place of service. The court
may consider the affidavit, or any other competent proofs, in
determining whether proper service has been made.
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
limit or affect the right to serve process in any other manner
provided by law.
2008
78B-3-207. Only claims arising from enumerated acts
may be asserted.
Only claims arising from acts enumerated in this part may
be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this part.
2008
78B-3-208. Default j u d g m e n t s .
(1) A default judgment may not be entered until the expiration of at least 30 days after service.
(2) A default judgment entered on service may be set aside
only on a showing which would be timely and sufficient to set
aside a default judgment entered on personal service within
this state.
2008
78B-3-209. When exercisable.
Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, jurisdiction
established under this part may be exercised regardless of
when the claim arose.
2008

PART 3
PLACE OF TRIAL — VENUE
78B-3-301. Actions involving real property.
(1) Actions for the following causes involving real property
shall be tried in the county in which the subject of the action,
or some part, is situated:
(a) for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or
interest in the property;
(b) for the determination, in any form, of the right or
interest in the property;
(c) for injuries to real property;
(d) for the partition of real property; and
(e) for the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real
property.
(2) If the real property is situated partly in one county and
partly in another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county selected is the proper county for the trial
of the action.
2008
78B-3-302. Actions to recover fines or penalties —
Against public officers.
(1) Actions to recover fines or penalties shall be tried in the
county where the cause, or some part of the cause, arose.
(2) If a fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed by statute is
imposed for an offense committed on a lake, river, or other
stream of water situated in two or more counties, the action
may be brought in any county bordering on the lake, river, or
stream opposite to the place where the offense was committed.
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AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection,]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment-]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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A m e n d . XIV, § 4

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be p a i d j
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec- 5- [Power to enforce amendment,]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16,
1866; declared to have been ratified by threefourths of all the states on July 28, 1868.

AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not
to disqualify.]

Section
2. [Power to enforce amendment]

Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.

Sec- 2, [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
History: Proposed by Congress on February
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by

more than three-fourths of all the states on
March 30, 1870.

AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.
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KATHERINE VENTI (9318)
JOHN P. BALL (9666)
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

Fli.ES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 1 2007
SALT

By.

rffWMi/

Attorneys for Schneider Canada, Inc.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GINGER GARDNER, individually and as
guardian of her minor child, SABRJLNA LYNN
GARDNER; HEATHER ANN GARDNER;
and JOSHUA LEE GARDNER,,
Plaintiffs,
!

v$.
SPX CORPORATION; HOJ ENGINEERING
& SALES CO., INC., d/b/a DOCK & DOOR
SERVICES, a Utah corporation; SCHNEIDER
ELECTRIC HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, SCHNEIDER CANADA, INC., a
Canadian Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-X„
Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
SCHNEIDER CANADA, INCS
MOTION TO DISMISS PIAINTIFFS'
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
Case No. 040922873
Judge Timothy R* Hanson
(Originally assigned to Judge Leslie A,
Lewis)

|

This matter came before the Court on Defendant Schneider Canada, Inc/s ("Schneider
Canada") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction ("Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss").

Opposition briefs to Schneider

Canada's Motion to Dismiss were filed separately by Plaintiffs and Defendant SPX Corporation

93&904
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("Defendant SPX'*). Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc. ("Defendant HOJ") filed no
responsive brief. Oral argument on the Motion was heard on January 25, 2007. The Court,
having fully considered Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support,
PlaintifFs Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant SPX's Memorandum in Opposition,
Schneider Canada's Reply bricfe, and all of the exhibits and affidavits attached to the respective
briefs and having heard oral argument of all the parties, makes the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Lawr
NATURE OF CASE AND PARTIES
1.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges thai; on or about November 2, 2002, Plaintiffs

decedent Aaron Gardner, in the course of his employment at the Sysco processing plant in West
Jordan, Utah, was unloading his vehicle at loading dock door number 51 and that the ieveler on
dock door number 51 apparently came down on him without warning, fatally crushing him.
2.

Plaintiff further alleges that the dock Ieveler installed at dock door number 51 was

designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant SPX and installed by Defendant HOX
3.

As to Schneider Canada, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant SPX has identified

Schneider Canada to be a party who is at fault for this accident; it has been alleged thai
Schneider Canada sold to Defendant SPX a defective part, which Defendant SPX installed on its
product that was sold and distributed and installed as Dock Door Number 51 at the Sysco West
Jordan Facility,
4.

Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action against Defendant SPX and

Schneider Canada: Negligence, Strict Liability, Failure to Warn, Breach of Express and Implied

936590.4
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Warranties, and Punitive Damages. Plaintiffs allege Negligence, Failure to Warn and Breach of
Implied Warranties and Punitive Damages against Defendant HOJ.
ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES
1

Schneider Canada brings its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Schneider

Canada is a Canadian Corporation with no place of business and no other significant presence in
the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not do business in Utah.
6.

Schneider Canada asserts that while it manufactured a component part of the

subject dock Icveler—specifically, the control box placed in the subject dock door levelcr—the
marketing, design, manufacture, construction, distribution and sale of the subject control box
occurred entirely in Canada. Schneider Canada asserts that "all communications regarding the
design, manufacture, construction, distribution and sale of the control box took place between
and amongst individuals in Canada. The sale of the control box was to a Canadian distributor for
distribution to the Canadian division of defendant SPX Corporation's predecessor-in-intorest
("Sereo)."
7-

As such, it is assorted, Schneider Canada—either in its general business practices

or in its involvement regarding the component part of the subject dock door leveler—did not
puiposefiilly avail itself of the privilege of doing business in the State of Utah. Accordingly, as
Schneider Canada argues, jurisdiction is not proper.
8.

Plaintiffs argue, among other things per their memorandum, that personal

jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper because Schneider Canada puiposefiilly designed,
marketed and delivered the control box into the national stream of commerce through a

93*590.4
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distributor who markets and sells the component box throughout the United States and Utah.
This, according to Plaintiffs, satisfies the due process requirements.

Additionally, argue

Plaintiffs, Schneider Canada is a billion dollar corporation with global reach, thus the burden
placed on it to litigate this case in Utah is minimal when compared to flic Plaintiffs' burden in
litigating in Canada,
9,

Defendant SPX Corporation similarly opposes Schneider Canada's Motion to

Dismiss for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum in Opposition to Schneider Canada's
Motion to Dismiss.
FINDINGS OF FACT
10,

Schneider Canada is cuixently incorporated under the Federal Laws of Canada

and its principle place of business is 19 Waterman Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M4B
1Y2.
11,

Schneider Canada's marketing, designing, manufacturing, construction, selling,

and distributing of the subject control box at issue occurred entirely in Canada,
12,

Schneider Canada designed the subject control box from specifications provided

by the Canadian division of Defendant SPX's predecessor, Serco.
13,

All communications regarding the marketing, design, manufacture, construction,

and sale Of the control box at issue took place between and amongst individuals in Canada,
including but not limited to representatives of Schneider Canada, representatives of Serco7s
Canadian division, and representatives of Guillevin International, Inc. ("Guillevin
International"), the Canadian distributor,

936590.4
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14.

Schneider Canada negotiated the sale of the subject control box in Canada to

Serco's Canadian division.
15.

Guillevin International sold the subject control box in Canada to Serco's

Canadian division.
16.

Some control boxes purchased from Schneider Canada were, in turn, sold by

Serco' s Canadian division to its affiliate in the United States.
17.

At the time of the marketing, design and manufacture of the subject control box

and its sale to the Canadian distributor Outllevin International, Schneider Canada was aware that
some control boxes would be installed in dock levelers for the United States market, but was not
specifically made aware that the control box in question would be used in the State of Utah.
18.

Schneider Canada does not do business in the State of Utah; is not registered to

conduct business in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada owns no property in the State of Utah,
pays no taxes, has no employees, officers, or offices in the State of Utah, and has not had any
continuous or systematic dealings with the State of Utah. None of Schneider Canada's
shareholders reside in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not maintain telephone or
facsimile listings within the State of Utah nor does it advertise in the State of Utah. Schneider
Canada has not conducted any business, communicated, or caused communications to occur with
any consumer in the State of Utah, nor do a substantial percentage of its sales derive from
revenue generated from customers in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not render
services to any customers in the State of Utah,

936590A
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19.

Schneider Canada is a subsidiary of Square D Company, a Delaware Corporation

with its principal place of business in Palatine, Illinois. Square D Company is a legal entity
separate and distinct from Schneider Canada. Square D Company did not market, design,
manufacture, construct, sell or distribute the subject electrical component or any component of
the dock leveler at issue in this litigation,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
20.

Having reviewed the Pleadings, Defendant Schneider Canada's Motion to

Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, its Memorandum and Replies in Support, Plaintiffs5
Memorandum in Opposition, and Defendant SPX's Memorandum in Opposition, and all
affidavits and exhibits thereto, and having heard oral argument of the parties, the Courtfindsthat
additional discovery is not required for the determination and resolution of the issue of whether
this Court has personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada*
21.

Schneider Canada is not conducting substantial and continuous local activity in

the State of Utah sufficient to meet the requirements for this Court to confer general jurisdiction
over Schneider Canada.
22.

With regard to specific jurisdiction^ while the facts in this case indicate that

Schneider Canada's actions may fulfill one or some of the enumerated requirements set forth in
Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-24 (West 2004)0**

Utah

Long-Arm Statute"), the assertion of

jurisdiction over Schneider Canada does not comport with the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider Canada does not have minimum contacts with Utah such that

936590.4
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the maintenance of the suit against it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
23.

Schneider Canada's actions of manufacturing the control box in Canada in

accordance to the specifications of the Canadian Division of Serco, and selling it to a Canadian
distributor fot ultimate placement in Serco's dock Icvclers is not activity sufficient to show that
Schneider Canada purposefully availed itself of conducting business in the State of Utah.
24.

Mere awareness on the part of Schneider Canada that some of the control boxes it

manufactured would be placed in dock Icvelere to be sold and used in the United States market is
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada in the State of Utah.
25.

The actions of Schneider Canada of placing the control box into the stream of

commerce are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada
26.

Schneider Canada's relationship with Square D Company, does not establish

jurisdiction over Schneider Canada,
27.

In light of the above findings, Defendant Schneider Canada is not subject to the

jurisdiction of the Court
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
i.

Defendant Schneider Canada, Inc's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth

Amended Complaint Based on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED;
ii.

This case is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction solely as to Schneider

Canada, Inc.

9H599A
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iii.

All parties shall bear thejr respective costs and fees relating to this Motion to

Dismiss.
DATED this J J _ day of,

/W\\

By:

2007

lf/^
'Timothy R. Hanson
Third District Court Judge
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Approved zspioxm:

CATHERINE VENTI
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc,
and Schneider Canada, Inc.
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Approved as to form;

ROBERT^ILCHRIST
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & MORTON
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

936590.4
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Approved as to form:

JfflMf-~fcfr6tT
KENNETH W.YEATES
7
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C.
Attorneysfor Defendant SPX Corporation
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Approved as to foim:

JOSEPF
j . JOYCE & ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co.
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FILJB DISTRICT COURT
Third Jur^r^: -

.<-.(

JUN 1 6 2009
SALT LAKE COoi.-i'

By. _ ^ C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

De ut Clerk

P *

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GINGER GARDNER, individually and
as guardian of her minor children
SABRINA LYNN GARDNER;
HEATHER ANN GARDNER;
and JOSHUA LEE GARDNER,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
CASE NO. 040922873

Plaintiffs,
vs.

SPX CORPORATION; HOJ
ENGINEERING &SALES CO., INC.,
dba DOCK & DOOR SERVICES,
a Utah corporation; SCHNEIDER
ELECTRIC HOLDING, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation;
and JOHN DOES I X ,
Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Attached is the Special Verdict Form which applies to the above case
Dated: June / ^ 2 0 0 9
By the Court

fer^
f
Robert P. Faust
District Court Judge
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. If you find that
the evidence favors the issues by a preponderance, answer "Yes." If you find that the evidence is
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find
that the greater weight of the evidence is against the issue, answer "No."
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the
same six on each question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each
question that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and then
advise the bailiff.
1.

Was Defendant SPX Corporation negligent in the design of its product?
ANSWER: YES

NO

\ /

If you answered "Yes" please aaswer Question No. 2.
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip Question No. 2 and please proceed
to Question No. 3.
2.

Was the negligence of Defendant SPX Corporation a proximate cause of Aaron
Gardner's death on November 2, 2002?
ANSWER: YES

NO

Please-proceed to Question No. 3.
3.

Did Defendant SPX Corporation manufacture and sell a product that contained a design
defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous?
ANSWER: YES

NO

\f

If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 4.
If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, skip Question No. 4 and please proceed
to Question No. 5.

4.

Was Defendant SPX's unreasonably dangerous product containing the design defect, a
proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002?
ANSWER: YES

NO

2
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Please proceed to Question No. 5. *
5.

Was Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door Services
negligent as alleged by the Plaintiffs?
ANSWER: YES

NO

If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 6.
If you answered "No" to Question No. 5, skip Question No. 6, but read the
instructions following Question No. 6.
6.

Was the negligence of Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door
Services a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002?
ANSWER: YES

NO

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1 and No. 2 and/or answered "Yes" to
Question No. 3 and No. 4 and/or if you answered "Yes" to Question No. 5 and
No. 6, then proceed to Question No. 7. If you did not answer "Yes" to those
Questions, then stop your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this
verdict.
If you answered "Yes" to either Question 2, 4 or 6, please proceed to Question
No. 7.

7.

Was Sysco Intermountain Food Services, Inc. negligent as alleged by the Defendants?
ANSWER: YES

NO

If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 8.
If you answered "No" skip Question no. 8 and please proceed to Question No. 9.
8.

Was the negligence of Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc. a proximate cause of Aaron
Gardner's death on November 2, 2002?
ANSWER: YES

NO

Please proceed to Question No. 9.
Was Aaron Gardner negligent as alleged by the Defendants?
ANSWER: YES

NO

3
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If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 10.
If you answered "No" skip Question No. 10 and proceed to Question No. 11.

10.

Was the negligence of Aaron Gardner a proximate cause of his death on November 2,
2002?
ANSWER: YES

NO

PleaseproceedtoQuestionNo.il

11.

•-

For each of the following parties you found to be negligent or made a unreasonably
dangerous product and was a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2,
2002, please state what percentage of fault that is attributable to that party. In other
words, if you answered either Question No. 1 or No. 2 "No," and answered either
Question No. 3 or No. 4 "No", then do not assign any percentage of fault to SPX
Corporation. If you answered Question No. 5 or No. 6 "No", do not assign any
percentage of fault to defendant HOJ.
The total of those to who fault is assigned must equal 100%.
A.

SPX Corporation

%

B.

HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc.,

%

C.

Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc.

%

D.

Aaron Gardner

*~
TOTAL:

%
100%

If you did not assign a percentage of fault to either SPX Corporation or HOJ, then stop
your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this verdict.
If you did assign a percentage of fault to either SPX or HOJ, please proceed to Question
No. 12.
12.

What amount do you find that would fairly compensate Plaintiffs for the harm suffered
by the death of Aaron Gardner. When making this decision, do not make a deduction
from damages for any percentage of fault that you have assessed to Aaron Gardner and/or
Sysco Intermountain Foods. The judge will make any necessary deductions later.
ECONOMIC

4
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a.

Past Lost Wages

b.

Future Lost Wages

c.

Past Fringe Benefits

d.

Future Fringe Benefits

e.

Past Lost Household Services

f.

Future Lost Household Services
TOTAL:

NON-ECONOMIC
A.

Ginger Gardner

B.

Sabrina Gardner

C.

Heather Gardner

D.

Joshua Gardner
TOTAL:

DATED this

l(f

day of June, 2009.

4

fl4jL^

FOREPERSON
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